In this paper, we analyze the extent to which market forces create an incentive for cloning human beings. We show that a market for cloning arises if a large enough fraction of the clone’s income can be appropriated by its model. Only people with the highest ability are cloned, while people at the bottom of the distribution of income specialize in surrogacy. In the short run, cloning reduces inequality. In the long run, it creates a perfectly egalitarian society where all workers have a top ability if fertility is uncorrelated with ability and if the distribution of ability among sexually produced children is the same as among their parents. In such a society, cloning has disappeared….
That is by Gilles Saint-Paul (original paper here) and you will find it discussed here.
I met Giles at a conference in Austria. Had nice dinner table chats. At the time, he was the only European in all of Europe who supported the Iraq war. He also has some nice papers on the economics of the year 3000. I was actually thinking about something quite similar on the economics of Artificial Intelligence after the singularity where robot brains surpass humans, but I certainly don't have the stature to write such papers yet. Assuming AIs adhere to Asimov's 3 laws, and are perfectly productive, then we get some simple things like labor becomes useless, thus wealth is only capital, so we can now have redistribution without consequences...